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Abstract
This paper presents a framework where dependable systems can be uniformly modeled and de-
pendable properties analyzed within the Generalized Non Deducibility on Compositions (GNDC ),
a scheme that has been proﬁtably used in deﬁnition and analysis of security properties. Precisely,
our framework requires a systems to be modelled using a formal calculus, here the CCS process
algebra, where both the failing behaviour of the system and the related fault-recovering procedures
are also explicitly described. An environment able to inject any fault in the system is then deﬁned
as a separated component. The parallel composition between the system and the environment
represents our scenario of analysis, where some fault tolerance property (e.g., fail stop, safe and
silent) are studied as instances of GNDC properties. By using diﬀerent instances of GNDC we are
able to argue about the availability of eﬀective methodologies of analysis, and on the possibility of
applying compositional techniques.
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1 Introduction
This paper exploits relationships between mechanisms for dependability anal-
ysis and those for security in a formal framework. More precisely it shows how
fault tolerance analysis mechanisms can beneﬁt of recent results in security
analysis.
First ideas about a relationship between security analysis strategies and
mechanisms of dependability analysis can be found in [14,15,10,21,22,25].
For example in a seminal paper [25], Weber found analogies between fault-
tolerance speciﬁcations and non-interference [8] deﬁnitions. He also argued
that the formal veriﬁcation of fault tolerance faces with similar problems and
beneﬁts of same solutions as veriﬁcation of security does. Analogies between
non-interferences approaches in security and safety analysis can be found
in [22]. Additional eﬀorts in exploiting fault tolerant approaches for security
analysis can be found for example in [7], where it is shown that fault toler-
ance and integrity analysis can be both based on a non-interference notion.
In [12], non-interference analysis has been shown to be similar to veriﬁcation
of open systems, i.e., when one needs to verify a system w.r.t. whatever
possible execution environment (also named as robustness). Remarkably, the
idea of applying dependability methodologies in security had been discussed
by Meadows in [14], where she also argued that security analysis might be
improved by incorporating techniques typical of reliability formal veriﬁcation.
On the other hand, Meadows and McLean also claim, in [15], that the use
of emerging results in security analysis could enrich the taxonomy of fault
prevention and removal strategies.
Anyway, as previous works seem to show, for long time security had ap-
peared a restricted paradigm w.r.t the variety of approaches available in de-
pendability. Most of the discussions in the literature have been based more on
ﬁnding intuitions for security starting from the dependability background and
experiences than the opposite. Along the last decade security has been studied
in so deep details that contributions of security theory into dependability can
be now more than in the past. For example we think that the non-interference
notion, widely used in security analysis (e.g., see [4,3,13,20,24]), could be re-
viewed in the dependability framework by considering the analysis techniques
developed so far, for non-interference, in the security area.
Following this direction this paper intends to inquire about the application
of the Generalized Non-Deducibility on Compositions (for short, GNDC ) for
the analysis of dependable systems, with particular attention to fault tolerant
ones. GNDC was ﬁrst introduced in [6] as a framework where a family of
security properties could be uniformly expressed and veriﬁed. It has never
been applied to dependability so far. Anyway GNDC ﬁnds its roots in non-
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interference analysis, whose intuitions has been claimed to share common
ideas with some fault tolerance analysis strategies (e.g., see [7,23]). Generally
speaking a GNDC property has the following form:
P satisﬁes GNDC α(P ) iﬀ ∀X ∈ Env : (P ‖ X)  α(P ) (1)
Informally it means that a system P enjoys GNDC α(P ) if and only if P shows,
w.r.t. a certain behavioral relation , the same behaviour of α(P ). This must
be true even if P is composed, by the parallel operator ‖, with any environment
X. Property (1) is parametric in , a relation among processes representing
the notion of “observation” and in α(P ), a speciﬁcation which describes the
expected behaviour of system P .
In this paper we will show how such a GNDC formulation can be exploited
for expressing safety properties peculiar of the dependability analysis: fail
stop, fail safe, fail silent. It constitutes a step towards a formal classiﬁcation
of dependable properties, similarly as it happened in security [5]. Moreover we
will show how some of the theoretical results of GNDC , (e.g., compositional
reasoning) originally stated for security analysis (e.g., see [5]), can be re-stated
and re-used in the analysis of dependability.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes how a fault tolerant
system may be modeled in CCS following a uniform modeling style. Section 3
introduces and explains the GNDC characterization of fault tolerance. Sec-
tion 4 provides intuition about how properties, such as fail stop, silent, and
safe can be expressed in the GNDC scheme. Section 5 discusses the problem of
analyzing dependability. It shows how a GNDC characterization of fault tol-
erance properties using trace-based behavioral equivalences, will enjoy some
appealing properties in analysis such as eﬀectiveness of analysis procedures
and compositionality. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Modeling Fault Tolerant Systems
To model a system we will use a process algebra. Here we refer to the CCS [16],
but our framework is completely general and it can be easily restated for other
process algebras as well (e.g., , CSP [9] or π-calculus [19]).
2.1 CCS background
The CCS language assumes a set of communication actions to represent emit-
ted signals or received ones. The special symbol τ is used to model any,
unobservable to the environment, internal action. Assuming a set L of com-
munication labels, Act = L∪ L is the set of visible actions (i.e., , actions and
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co-actions), and Act τ = Act ∪ {τ} denotes the full set of possible communi-
cation actions. We let a, b to range over Act τ . In summary the syntax of the
language deﬁning all CCS processes is the following grammar:
P,Q ::= 0 | a.P | P + Q | P ‖ Q | P \ L | P [f ] | A
Informally 0 is the process that does not perform any action; a.P is the ac-
tion preﬁx operator; P + Q can, non deterministically, choose between the
behaviour the process P or that of the process Q; ‖ is the parallel operator;
P \ L is the action restriction operator, meaning that the labels a ∈ L can
only be performed within a communication. P [f ] is the re-labelling operator,
renaming each label a into f(a). Finally we assume that every process iden-
tiﬁer A has a deﬁning equation of the form A
def
= P . The semantics of CCS
is given operationally over labeled transition systems (see [16]), whose transi-
tion relation → deﬁnes the usual concept of derivation in one step: P
a
→ P ′
means that process P , by executing action a ∈ Act τ , evolves in one step in the
process P ′, while we write P
a
→ to underline that P can perform action a to
evolve in some process. We will write →∗ the transitive and reﬂexive closure
of
⋃
a∈Actτ
a
→. In the following we will let Der(P ) = {P ′|P →∗ P
′}, Sort(P )
is the set of labels used by P , and EF = {X : Sort(X) ⊆ F ∪ {τ}}, where F
is a set of actions.
2.2 Specifying Fault Tolerant Systems
Using process algebras it is possible to provide a uniform framework for spec-
ifying fault tolerant systems. For example in [1,2], a variant of the CCS was
used to model a system, its failing behavior, its recovery strategies and its
fault assumptions (i.e., assumption on the occurrences of faults); fault toler-
ant properties expressed as logic formulas are veriﬁed on a ﬁnite state model
of the system through model checking.
Here we will follow a similar modeling approach, but diﬀerently from [1,2]
we will not require any speciﬁc fault assumption to be explicitly described in
the formal model of the system. In fact we are mainly interested in evaluating
the system behaviour in a general and unspeciﬁed faulty environment. In
other words we look at the fault tolerant analysis as the analysis of an open
system [13] acting in an environment which is potentially able to induce any
fault in the system.
In the following, when talking about formal models of fault tolerant sys-
tems, we will refer to the deﬁnitions below:
A system model is a CCS process P describing the behaviour of the system
through the execution of actions. It is generally a parallel composition of
sub-processes, each modeling sub-components of the system, communicating
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each other. 
A failing system model is a CCS process PF , obtained by extending the
process P with the possibility of executing particular external actions from
a set F of possible fault actions. After each fault action, the relative failure
mode is also speciﬁed in PF for example, by describing the behaviour induced
by the occurrence of the fault. 
A fault tolerant (candidate) system model is a CCS process P#F obtained
by adding to PF some processes realizing error-recover strategies in accor-
dance to some fault tolerant design strategy (e.g., copies of component,
triple modular redundancy, voting etc.). In general the application of fault
tolerance techniques in modeling leads to a process P#F which may be de-
scribed in the CCS notation as:
P#F = (P
(1)
F ‖ · · · ‖ P
(n)
F ‖ Q) \ A
where (a) P
(1)
F . . . P
(n)
F are n copies of PF composed together (b) Q is a
process representing additional components or an error detection module,
(c) A = {a1, · · · , an}, ai ∈ F , are the labels of synchronization actions
between P
(i)
F ’s and Q. 
Occurrences of faults are induced by a fault-injector process FF , that causes
faults to happen. It interacts with P#F exactly through f ∈ F actions. 
Previous deﬁnitions converge into the following scenario for fault tolerance
analysis, where a system model and a fault injector are composed together:
scenario = (PF
# ‖ FF )\F (2)
It is worth to remark that in (2) fault actions are hidden i.e., restricted.
This implies that PF and FF have to synchronize on fault events. As a con-
sequence faults are considered internal (i.e., not observable) actions of the
failing systems. This means that our analysis lies at the abstraction level
where what it is really observable is only the (eventually faulty) behaviour of
a system, but not the single occurrence of a fault. Thus in our framework,
roughly speaking, fault tolerance means that faults cannot interfere with the
normal observable behavior of the system.
Note that, diﬀerently from other approaches (e.g., [1]), we assume the
faulty behavior is described in the system PF
#, rather than also in the fault
injector FF . This is the technical trick to encode fault tolerance analysis as
non-interference analysis and, eventually, as the GNDC one.
Example 2.1 As a classic example, we will give a CCS model of a simple
fault tolerant system. The basic component is a module Battery which naively
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returns one slot of energy when it receives a request. For sake of conciseness
we will write our example in a value passing style CCS, which is known to be
a shortcut for CCS [16]. The actions get and ret are used to communicate
module inputs and outputs:
Battery
def
= get.ret(1).Battery
In modeling the corresponding failing module we assume that the battery,
after having received a request, may crash and non-deterministically produce
either a valid energy slot (1) or an invalid energy slot (0):
Batteryf
def
= get.
(ret(1).Batteryf
+f.
∑
x∈{0,1}(ret(x).Batteryf ))
In accordance to our modeling framework, the fault is assumed to be caused by
a special fault action f triggered by the environment. A fault tolerant battery
may be, for example, designed by using redundancy with two batteries, with
the additional modules of a splitter Splitter , and a controller Controller . We
require the splitter to deliver the energy request to each of the two redundant
instances, respectively Battery (1) and Battery (2), while we require the collec-
tor to avoid an overloaded production of energy by absorbing the eventually
additional slot. Formally, the two instances of the battery, and their faulty
version are, for i ∈ {1, 2}:
Battery (i)
def
=Battery [geti/get, reti/ret]
Battery
(i)
f
def
=Batteryf [geti/get, reti/ret]
The splitter and the controller are, for example, the following processes:
Splitter
def
= get.get1.get2.ack.Splitter
Controller
def
= ret1(x1).ret2(x2).if x1 then ret(x1).ack.Controller
else ret(x2).ack.Controller
Note the action ack required for synchronizing the splitter and the con-
troller. A resulting fault tolerant model of the battery Batteryf
#, may be
obtained, for example, by inserting a single faulty module in the redundant
solution (see also Figure 1):
Batteryf
# def= (Splitter ‖ Battery1 ‖
Battery2f ‖ Controller) \ {get1, get2ret1, ret2, ack}
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(ack)
get Splitter Controller ret
Battery
(2)
f
Battery(1)
f
(ret2)(get2)
(get1) (ret1)
Fig. 1. The ﬂow diagram of Batteryf
#. Internal action are in brackets.
The resulting scenario for the analysis of fault tolerance is the following:
scenario = (Batteryf
# ‖ Ff ) \ {f}
3 Fault Tolerance Characterization in GNDC
This section reports GNDC basic ideas and explains how fault tolerance prop-
erties can be expressed within the GNDC scheme. From Section 1 we already
know that a GNDC property has the following general form:
P satisﬁes GNDC α(P ) iﬀ ∀X ∈ Env : (P ‖ X)  α(P )
This scheme is general enough to implement a wide class of security prop-
erty deﬁnitions. In fact for example, more speciﬁc security properties such
as the Bisimulation-based Non Deducibility on Compositions (BNDC ), and
the Trace Equivalence-based Non Deducibility on Compositions [3], can be
subsumed as GNDC properties.
A ﬁrst step required for instantiating GNDC in fault tolerance is to specify
what P and Env are in this context. The former is a process P#F obtained
following the uniform modeling framework introduced in Section 2. The latter
is the environment of all fault injectors (e.g., our fault assumption models),
that is the set of CCS processes whose alphabet of actions is in F . Formally
Env = EF = {X | Sort(X) ⊆ F ∪ {τ}}. Then the general GNDC scheme we
propose for fault tolerance, is then the following:
Definition 3.1 [Fault Tolerance Characterisation in GNDC ]
P satisﬁes GNDC α(P ) iﬀ ∀FF ∈ EF : (P
#
F ‖ FF) \ F  α(P
#
F ) (3)
Let us observe that the clear separation between the system model and
the environment made in (2) of Section 2 will allow us to leave FF unspeciﬁed
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and to range it over EF .
Moreover the instantiation of GNDC in fault tolerance requires α(PF) to
be suitable in expressing some basic property of fault tolerance (e.g., fail safe,
fail silent, fail stop). Finally we are interested in understanding what families
of equivalences  can be suitable for the analysis of such properties. This
will be argument of the following sections, where we will write P instead of
P#F when no explicit reference to the speciﬁcation framework of Section 2 is
required.
4 Fault Tolerance Properties as Instances of GNDC
In this section we provide intuitions about how to express some interesting
fault tolerance property within the GNDC scheme. Generally speaking prop-
erties are modeled via a modiﬁed version α(P ), of P , representing the expected
behavior P . For example if we assume a fail stop property, α(P ) has to ex-
press a modiﬁed behavior of P in which any occurrence of a fault necessarily
brings to a system stop. We assume that if P is a ﬁnite state processes, α(P )
must be ﬁnite state as well.
Fail Stop A model of a system P#F is expected to be fail stop when in case
of fault it switches in a stop state, eventually after having performed some
internal actions. Intuitively α(P#F ) is the process whose expanded expres-
sion (i.e., the tree obtained by unfolding the process term by applying the
expansion law [16]) is obtained by the one of PF by substituting every fault
action (and relative sub-tree), with a silent action followed by the process
0. For example, referring to our example, we have that:
αstop(Batteryf )
def
= get.(ret(1).Batteryf + τ.0)
Fail Safe A model of a system P#F is expected to be fail safe if in case of
fault it switches in a safe state. In this case α(P#F ) is the process whose
expanded expression is obtained from the one of PF by substituting every
fault action (and relative sub-tree) with a silent action followed by some
“safe behaviour” (e.g., a shutdown). For example we have that:
αsafe(Batteryf)
def
= get.(ret(1).Batteryf + τ.Psafe)
where Psafe models a particular “safe” behavior.
Fail Silent A model of a system P#F is expected to be fail silent if a fault is
ignored. In this case the expanded expression of α(P#F ) is the one obtained
from the one of PF after having substituted every fault action (and relative
sub-tree) with a silent action followed by the subtree modeling the non-
failing behavior. In other words every fault occurrences and any successive
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failing behaviors are replace by a silent action. For example we have:
αsilent(P )
def
= get.(ret(1).Batteryf + τ.Batteryf)
Fault tolerance A model of a system P#F is expected to be fault tolerant if
its behaviour is observationally equal to the behaviour of the module that
does not fail at all. In this case then αft(P
#
F ) = P
#
F \ F , that is the fault
tolerant systems that can never execute any fault action.
5 Fault Tolerance Analysis Strategies in GNDC
This section provides deeper details about the analysis of fault tolerance in
the GNDC scheme.
5.1 Weak Bisimulation in GNDC for Fault Tolerance
We can use weak bisimulation to verify a system model P#F to be fault tolerant,
w.r.t. the fault tolerant properties previously described in term of α(P#F ).
In fact, in case an external observer cannot see τ actions, a natural way of
considering that two processes are equivalent is abstracting these actions from
their behaviour while preserving the branching structure of the processes. Let
us consider the following relation between CCS terms: P
τ
=⇒ P ′ if P
τ
−→∗ P
′,
and P
α
=⇒ P ′ if P
τ
−→∗
α
−→
τ
−→∗ P
′. We recall from [17] the deﬁnition of
weak bisimulation (i.e., observational) between processes requiring that two
bisimilar processes are able to simulate each other step by step:
Definition 5.1 A symmetric relation B on E×E is a weak bisimulation if for
each (P,Q) ∈ B and for each a ∈ Act τ :
if P
a
−→ P ′ then ∃Q′ : Q
a
=⇒ Q′ and (P ′, Q′) ∈ B
Two processes P and Q are bisimilar (written P ≈bisim Q) if a bisimulation B
exists such that (P,Q) ∈ B.
Weak bisimulation resorts to be useful to detect most of the safety prop-
erties we have so far deﬁned, namely fail safe, fail silent, fail stop and fault
tolerance (expressed by, resp., αstop, αsilent, αsafe and αft). Some liveness prop-
erties (e.g., deadlock freedom) may be caught too.
Moreover let us observe that the GNDC ’s instance where  is ≈bisim, and
where α(P ) is αft(P
#
F ) = P
#
F \F (i.e., exactly the “fault-tolerance” property),
is the BNDC re-stated in our fault tolerance framework. In fact
P satisﬁes GNDC
αft(P
#
F
)
≈bisim iﬀ ∀FF ∈ EF : (P
#
F ‖ FF) \ F ≈bisim P
#
F \ F (4)
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and we remind the following
Definition 5.2 [[3]] P is BNDC iﬀ ∀X ∈ EF : (P ‖F X) ≈bisim P \ F
Proposition 5.3 ([6]) P is BNDC if and only if P is GNDC P\F≈bisim.
As a ﬁnal observation let us discuss that BNDC is not compositional w.r.t.
parallel composition (see [12]), that is from P, P ′ ∈ BNDC it cannot be de-
duced that P ‖ P ′ ∈ BNDC . This could be an undesirable properties in
analysis. Anyway there are bisimulation based-equivalences that are compo-
sitional (e.g., see SBSNNI in [3]) that implied BNDC , so that they could be
used to prove suﬃcient condition for fault tolerance, and the formulation of
fault-tolerance given in (4) results attractive from this point of view.
The use of SBSNNI is not the only way to obtain compositionality in anal-
ysis. Alternative strategies for it may be obtained using diﬀerent observational
equivalence than weak bisimulation relation in (3) as we are explaining in the
Section 5.2.2.
5.2 Other observational relations in GNDC for Fault Tolerance
Weak bisimulation resorts to be useful to detect most of the properties deﬁned
so far. Anyway let observe that in a practical situation we expect that many
systems will be fault tolerant when weaker condition are satisﬁed. Generally
it may be not a problem that one can deduce the existence of faults, so long
the system behaviour response to those faults is “good enough”. For example,
the deﬁnition of fault tolerance given in (4) seems too strong and prevents the
observer to deduce that any faults have occurred. Out of deadlock detection,
for the all safety properties deﬁned in this paper the ability to distinguish the
branching structures is not required or necessary, or even dangerous: in fact
safety properties, that informally can be read [11] like “nothing bad can hap-
pen”, require to be satisﬁed independently the (branching) path conducting
to a fault. This makes us to resort to weak form of observational equivalences,
such as trace equivalence and simulation that will also have, within GNDC
theory, positive eﬀect on compositionality and on avoiding the universal quan-
tiﬁcation of fault injectors over the faulty environment. In the following we
will write P ‖F Q as a shortcut for (P ‖ Q) \F , and we will refer to a generic
α( ) function. Obviously the results will also hold for all α( )’s of our.
5.2.1 Most General (Faulty) Environment
The possibility of avoiding universal quantiﬁer in expression (3) is based on the
following theory about pre-congruences. We will say that  is a pre-congruence
w.r.t. ‖F if for every P, P
′, X,∈ EF if P  P
′ then P ‖F X  P
′ ‖F X. The
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following results hold for pre-congruences:
Proposition 5.4 ([6]) Let be  a pre-congruence w.r.t. ‖F . If there exists a
process Top ∈ EF such that for every process X ∈ EF we have X  Top, then:
P ∈ GNDC α(P ) iﬀ (P ‖F Top)  α(P )
In particular, if the hypothesis of the proposition above holds then it is
suﬃcient to check that α(P ) is satisﬁed when P is composed with the most
general environment, Top. In our fault tolerance analysis context it would
permit to make only one single check, in order to prove that a fault tolerance
property holds in every fault scenario. We have also the following corollary
for the congruence induced by :
Corollary 5.5 ([6]) Let  to be a pre-congruence w.r.t. ‖F and let  be
deﬁned as  ∩ −1. If there exist two processes Bot ,Top ∈ EF such that for
every process X ∈ EF we have Bot  X  Top then
P ∈ GNDC α iﬀ (P ‖F Bot)  (P ‖F Top)  α(P )
We show that whenever we are interested in properties based on the
notion of trace equivalence, Proposition 5.4 and Corollary 5.5 hold. Let
a = a1 . . . an ∈ Act
∗ be a sequence of actions. We write P
a
=⇒ P ′ if and
only if there exists P1, . . . , Pn ∈ E such that P
a1=⇒ P1
a2=⇒ . . .
an=⇒ Pn. Let be
T (P ) = {a ∈ Act∗ : ∃P ′, P
a
=⇒ P ′} the set of traces associated to a process
P . We have:
Definition 5.6 Let P and Q be two processes. Moreover Q can execute all
the traces of P (written P ≤trace Q) if and only if T (P ) ⊆ T (Q). P and Q
are said trace equivalent (written P ≈trace Q) if and only if T (P ) = T (Q).
It is easy to prove that ≤trace is a pre-congruence with respect to the CCS
operators.
Proposition 5.7 ≤trace is a pre-congruence w.r.t. ‖F
Proof. By reasoning of transition rules structures. 
In addition we can prove the existence of the most general (failing) envi-
ronment, and provide its description. Let us consider the following process:
TopF =
∑
f∈F
f.TopF + f.TopF (5)
It is easy to demonstrate that:
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Proposition 5.8 If X ∈ EF then X ≤trace Top
F .
Proof. By induction on the length of the traces generated by X. 
So we have proved that there exists a most general environment with re-
spect to ≤trace. A similar conclusion can be obtained when the following
simulation relation is considered:
Definition 5.9 [[18]] Let S a binary relation on E × E. Then S is said a
simulation if for each (P,Q) ∈ S and for each a ∈ Act τ , if P
a
−→ P ′ then
there exists Q′ such that Q
a
=⇒ Q′ and (P ′, Q′) ∈ S.
We write Q ≤sim P if there exists a simulation S such that (P,Q) ∈ S.
It is easy to prove that ≤sim is a pre-congruence with respect to the CCS
operators, admitting the same most general environment in (5).
Proposition 5.10 The following results hold
(i) ≤sim is a pre-congruence w.r.t. ‖F
(ii) if X ∈ EF then X ≤sim Top
F .
Proof. (1) by reasoning of transition rules structures; (2) by induction on the
length of the traces generated by X. 
As a conclusion, when ≤trace and ≤sim are used as process relations, to
check that P satisﬁes GNDC properties can be carried out only against the
“most general (faulty) environment”, for example by running some existing
tool for non-interference [12].
5.2.2 Compositional Analysis of Fault Tolerance
This section illustrates that, when ≤trace and ≤sim are used as process equiva-
lences in our analysis scheme, compositional proof rules for establishing that a
system enjoys GNDC can be applied. Compositionality is a desirable property
in veriﬁcation to infer a global fault tolerance exploiting local fault tolerance
results. Let us show it with a simple example, obtained by extending exam-
ple 2.1 with the following processes
Torch
def
= get.ret(x).[if x = 1 then flash else no flash].0
S
def
= (Torch ‖ Batteryf
#) \ {get, ret}
representing the behaviour of a ﬂashing torch Torch using the fault tolerant
energizer of Example 2.1. The energizer is expected to furnish one units of
energy, even in case of fault. The ﬂashing torch Torch emits a flash action
whenever it receives exactly one unit of energy, no flash otherwise. What
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an observer watching at the system S, obtained by composing the torch and
the energizer, expects is to see only flash actions. (Recall that the system
Batteryf
# provides only ret(1).) This safety properties can be formalized as:
S ∈ GNDC
α(S)
≤sim
iﬀ ∀Ff ∈ Ef : S ‖f Ff ≤sim α(S)
def
= flash.0
where the ≤sim relation has been used. In this case the expected behaviour
(given through α(S)) is that one unit of energy is furnished (and so one flash
is observed). It is easy to convince us that the given speciﬁcation of the
system enjoys our safety property. Let us now consider a system Sn obtained
by composing (in parallel) n instances of the system S and a similar safety
property, on the Sn, that reﬂects the question “only at most n ﬂashes are
observed”. In our scheme this is equivalent to prove that:
Sn ∈ GNDC
α(S)n
≤sim
iﬀ ∀Ff ∈ Ef : S
n ‖f Ff ≤sim α(S)
n def= α(S) ‖ . . . ‖ α(S)︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
Compositionality would made the previous statement true, for any ﬁxed
n, without the needs of any additional check. In the following we prove that
it is really the case when ≤trace or ≤sim are used. The following results hold:
Proposition 5.11 Let P1 and P2 be two processes such that Pi ∈ GNDC
α(Pi)
≤trace
for i = 1, 2. Then
• P1 ‖ P2 ∈ GNDC
α(P1)‖α(P2)
≤trace
• P1 ‖ P2 ∈ GNDC
α(P1)‖α(P2)
≤sim
Proof. Exploiting the existence of the most general environment Top, and
the fact that ≤trace (resp.≤sim) is a pre-congruence. 
A ﬁnal discussion about the applicability of compositionality must be done.
We have aﬃrmed that using the results of this section, global fault tolerance
can be deduced from local fault tolerance. Here with local fault tolerance we
intend the property enjoyed by the formal speciﬁcations of sub-systems which
are required to be fault tolerant by their own. With global fault tolerance we
intend the property enjoyed by the speciﬁcation of a system which is obtained
by the composition of such sub-systems without the adjoint of any other global
modules, such as a voter. Obviously we do not expect compositionality hold
in such cases. This discussion would merit to be better developed, but being
far from the scope of this paper we leave it for future works.
S. Gnesi et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 99 (2004) 111–126 123
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have shown how to formalize fault tolerance within the GNDC
framework i.e., a general scheme for expressing security properties in a process
algebra context.
Once characterized as GNDC property, fault tolerance can beneﬁt of vari-
ous of theoretical results and analysis techniques. Those results and strategies
are peculiar of the research background in security analysis. Speciﬁcally when
either a trace or a simulation relations are used to characterized fault tol-
erance properties, the GNDC theory assures eﬃcient analysis procedures to
exist. Speciﬁcally it beneﬁts both of a static characterization (which gets rid
oﬀ the universal quantiﬁcation over all the possible fault scenarios), and of
compositionality proofs. Another advantage of our uniform characterization
is the possibility to compare dependability properties as done for the secu-
rity ones in the GNDC framework. Potentially, this could be a preliminary
step towards a formal and uniform taxonomy of dependability and security
properties.
Anyway the general contribution of this paper aims to be wider. In fact by
this work we intend to sustain the trend that watches at security as a research
ﬁeld whose applications in dependability analysis are still emerging. This is
with greatest reason true if one considers the great deal of results around
security recently appeared in the literature. We leave as a future work to
extend our study over the characterization of other dependability properties.
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